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INTRODUCTION
In April, 2005, the Seventh Circuit decided the case of Kircher v.
Putnam Funds Trust and Putnam Investment Management, L.L.C.1
The result of this case limits the viability of state court securities
actions by expanding the standing requirements for federal securities
actions and by declaring that certain actions will either be preempted,
compelled to be brought as derivative actions, or committed to public
prosecutors.2
In Kircher, the plaintiff class, defining itself as entirely non-sellers
and non-purchasers, brought suit in state court alleging securities
fraud.3 The issue on appeal was whether their state law claims were
preempted by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
(“SLUSA”).4 The Seventh Circuit held that the purchaser-seller rule
announced in the Supreme Court case Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores5 did not affect SLUSA’s coverage, and therefore a
plaintiff class that only held securities, as opposed to one that
∗

J.D. candidate 2006, Chicago-Kent College of Law; B.S., Psychology,
University of Illinois Champaign-Urbana 2001.
1
403 F.3d 478 (7th Cir. 2005).
2
Id.
3
Id. at 480, 482.
4
15 U.S.C. § 77p (2000).
5
421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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purchased or sold securities, would nevertheless have their claims
preempted by SLUSA.6 In addition, the Seventh Circuit held, in
contradiction to its sister circuits, that the recourse for a non-trading
class was to file a derivative action or commit the case to public
prosecutors as opposed to relegating the case to state court.7
Part I of this note outlines the relevant federal securities laws at
issue, including the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(“PSLRA”),8 § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,9 and
Rule 10b-5.10 Part II describes in detail the recent Seventh Circuit
opinion in Kircher. Part III contrasts the Kircher decision with the
1975 Supreme Court case of Blue Chip Stamps, wherein the court held
that plaintiffs who did not purchase or sell securities during the class
period did not have standing to pursue a private damages action under
Rule 10b-5. Part IV of this note compares the Kircher decision with
how other circuits have interpreted the scope of SLUSA. Part V
concludes that the Seventh Circuit was incorrect in concluding that
SLUSA is not affected by the purchaser-seller rule in Blue Chip
Stamps and that the proper recourse for a plaintiff class consisting of
non-purchasers and non-sellers is to commit the case to public
prosecutors or pursue a derivative action as opposed to litigating the
claim in state court.
I. SLUSA
In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”)11 to “curb abuses of federal securities
fraud litigation” arising under the Securities Act of 1933 and the
6

Kircher, 403 F.3d at 483-84.
Id. at 484.
8
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in part at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1,
78u-4 (2000)).
9
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
10
17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2005).
11
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995) (codified in part at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4).
7
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Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.12 Pursuant to Rule 10b-5, which
is based on § 10(b) of the 193413 Act:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact
or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.14
Heightened pleading standards for class action plaintiffs were one
of the reforms that the PSLRA imposed.15 However, a loophole was
created, allowing plaintiffs to avoid the PSLRA’s pleading
12

Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25, 31 (2d
Cir. 2005) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2000)).
For example, the PSLRA sought to deter strike suits in which private plaintiffs filed
federal securities fraud claims of questionable merit in order to obtain large
settlements. See Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 306 (2d Cir. 2000).
13
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
14
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (emphasis added).
15
Dabit, 395 F.3d at 32 (citing 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b)). For example, a
complaint under the PSLRA must allege that the defendant made an “untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading.” In addition, “the complaint shall specify each statement
alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is
misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on
information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which
that belief is formed.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b).
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requirements by filing suits in state courts under state statutory or
common law.16 As a result, the PSLRA failed to achieve its goal of
curtailing meritless class actions, and in response Congress enacted the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (“SLUSA”) in 1998.17
Congress enacted SLUSA in order to “prevent certain State private
securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to
frustrate the objectives” of the PSLRA.18 Too many securities class
action lawsuits had shifted from federal to state courts, thereby making
it difficult to hold securities class action plaintiffs to the stringent
standards of the PSLRA.19 Under SLUSA, Congress intended to close
the loophole “by making federal court the exclusive venue for class
actions alleging fraud in the sale of certain covered securities and by
mandating that such class actions be governed exclusively by federal
law.”20 SLUSA provides parallel provisions to the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in order to limit certain
class actions under state law.21 The relevant portion reads:
No covered class action22 based upon the statutory
or common law of any State or subdivision thereof may
16

Dabit, 395 F.3d at 32.
15 U.S.C. § 77p (2000).
18
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 2, 112
Stat. 3227 (1998).
19
Id.
20
Dabit, 395 F.3d at 33 (quoting Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co.,
251 F.3d 101, 108 (2d. Cir. 2001)).
21
Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust and Putnam Inv. Mgmt., L.L.C., 403 F.3d
478, 481 (7th Cir. 2005). The Court limits its attention to § 16 of the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77p, because the additions to the 1934 Act are functionally identical.
22
15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2). The term “covered class action” means: “(i) any
lawsuit in which – (I) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons or
prospective class members, and questions of law or fact common to those persons or
members of the prospective class, without reference to issues of individualized
reliance on an alleged misstatement or omission, predominate over any questions
affecting only individual persons or members; or (II) one or more named parties seek
to recover damages on a representative basis on behalf of themselves and other
unnamed parties similarly situated, and questions of law or fact common to those
17
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be maintained in any State or Federal court by any
private party alleging:
(1) an untrue statement or omission of a material
fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a
covered security; or
(2) that the defendant used or employed any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
connection with the purchase or sale of a covered
security.23
In addition, SLUSA renders any covered class action brought in
state court removable to federal court.24 According to the Second
Circuit in Dabit, four requirements must be met in order for SLUSA to
apply: “(1) the underlying suit must be a ‘covered class action’; (2) the
action must be based on state or local law; (3) the action must concern
a ‘covered security’; and (4) the defendant must have misrepresented
or omitted a material fact or employed a manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of’ that
security.”25 The courts were mindful that plaintiffs might seek to
avoid federal jurisdiction by creatively framing their complaints in
such a way as to allege that the misrepresentations were not “in
connection with” the sale or purchase of stock. In response to this
type of strategy, the Eighth Circuit held that under SLUSA, a plaintiff
“may not avoid federal question jurisdiction and the preemption of

persons or members of the prospective class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual persons or members; or (ii) any group of lawsuits filed in or
pending in the same court and involving common questions of law or fact, in which
(I) damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons; and (II) the lawsuits are
joined, consolidated, or otherwise proceed as a single action for any purpose.”
23
15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (emphasis added).
24
Id. § 77p(c).
25
Dabit, 395 F.3d at 33 (citing Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, &
Smith, Inc. 292 F.3d 1334, 1342 (11th Cir. 2002)).
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state law claims by artfully concealing the federal question in an
otherwise well-pleaded complaint under state law.”26
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN KIRCHER V. PUTNAM FUNDS
TRUST AND PUTNAM INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, L.L.C.
In Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust and Putnam Investment
Management, L.L.C., the Seventh Circuit was confronted with whether
SLUSA preempted litigation in state court.27 The Kircher plaintiffs
filed claims in state court alleging that the defendant mutual funds had
set their prices in such a way that left them vulnerable to arbitrageur
exploitation.28 Mutual funds are required to set prices at which they
sell and redeem their own shares once each day.29 Each of the
defendant mutual fund sets the price at which they sell and redeem
their own shares at 4 p.m. Eastern time each day, shortly after the New
York Stock Exchange closes.30 Any order that is placed before 4 p.m.
is executed at that price.31 The mutual funds value securities at the
closing price of the principal exchange or market in which the
securities are traded.32 Whereas this yields a current price for
domestic securities, it may produce a price that is as much as fifteen
hours old for securities of foreign issuers.33 For example, Asian
markets close twelve to fifteen hours before New York, and European
markets close five or six hours ahead of New York. Many securities
trade on multiple markets or over the counter.34 If, for example, stock
in Japan moves predominantly up during the interval between the
26

Id. at 34 (quoting Dudek v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 295 F.3d 875, 879 (8th Cir.

2002)).
27

403 F.3d 478, 480 (7th Cir. 2005).
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
28
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closing of the Asian market and the closing of the New York market,
the mutual fund would carry a 4 p.m. price below what would be
justified by the latest available information.35 Arbitrageurs could take
advantage of this discrepancy by purchasing the shares of the foreign
stock before 4 p.m. and then selling that stock for profit the following
day.36
The Kircher plaintiffs framed their complaints to avoid any
allegations of purchase or sale.37 All but one of the classes were
defined as investors who held shares of a given mutual fund during the
class period.38 The plaintiffs alleged that the mutual funds acted
recklessly in failing to prevent arbitrageurs from reaping the profits
described above.39 The plaintiffs argued that the mutual funds could
have taken such precautions by levying fees on short-swing
transactions,40 adopting to a front-end-load charge,41 reducing the
number of trades any investor can execute (or deferring each trade by
one day), or valuing the securities of foreign issuers at the most
current price in any competitive market, and not just the closing price
on the issuers’ home stock exchanges.42
The defendant mutual funds removed the suits to federal court and
moved the court to dismiss the claims under SLUSA.43 Instead of
dismissing the claims, the district court remanded each of the lawsuits,
and the mutual funds appealed.44 Despite the plaintiffs’ claims that
they only held shares during the relevant class period, the Seventh
35

Id.
Id.
37
Id. at 482.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 481.
40
Fees imposed on a corporate insider for a purchase or sale of company stock
within a six-month period. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1413 (8th ed. 2004).
41
Mutual fund that charges a commission when shares are purchased. BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1043 (8th ed. 2004).
42
Kircher, 403 F.3d at 481.
43
Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2000).
44
Kircher, 403 F.3d at 481.
36
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Circuit found that allegations of purchases and sales were implicit in
the complaint and that the plaintiffs were merely trying to evade
SLUSA.45 In deciding whether SLUSA blocked litigation in state
court, the Seventh Circuit held that the “in connection with” language
of SLUSA was as broad as the parallel language in § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and its corresponding regulation,
Rule 10b-5.46 Therefore, because the plaintiffs’ claims satisfied
SLUSA, they were preempted from litigating their claims in state
court.47 The court further held that the purchaser-seller rule
announced in the Supreme Court case Blue Chip Stamps did not
restrict the coverage of SLUSA.48 As a result, the plaintiffs’ claims
did not fall outside the ambit of the federal securities laws, and
therefore, their claims were to be left to public enforcement or litigated
as derivative actions instead.49 The problem with this outcome is that
an action brought by public prosecutors or as a derivative action would
grant no financial relief to the plaintiffs individually. Rather, any
relief granted would be diverted to the government or a corporation.
III. THE HEART OF THE ISSUE: HOW BLUE CHIP STAMPS V. MANOR DRUG
STORES IMPACTS THE SCOPE OF SLUSA
45

Id. at 482 (finding that some plaintiffs must have purchased or increased
their interest during the class period and that others “undoubtedly” sold some or all
of their shares during the class period).
46
Id. at 483-84 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77p; 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000); 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (2005)). The pertinent part of § 10(b) states: “It shall be unlawful for any
person . . . to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security .
. . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.” 15 U.S.C. § 78j. The pertinent
part of Rule 10b-5 states: “It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to engage in any
act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
47
Id. at 484.
48
Id. at 482-83 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975)).
49
Id. at 484.
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Well before the PSLRA or SLUSA were enacted, the Supreme
Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores decided the question
of whether a plaintiff may maintain a private cause of action under
Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission, despite the
fact that they had neither purchased nor sold any securities.50 In that
case, the plaintiffs, comprising a company that provided stamps to
retailers and nine retailers who owned 90% of its shares, alleged that
the defendant Blue Chip Stamp Co. had prepared and distributed a
prospectus containing a “materially misleading and overly
pessimistic” appraisal of the company.51 The plaintiffs claimed that
this prospectus was issued in order to discourage plaintiffs from
buying Blue Chip shares so that the defendant could later sell the
shares to the public at a higher price.52 The Court held that the
plaintiffs did not have standing to bring this cause of action under Rule
10b-5 because such actions were limited by the purchaser-seller rule:
only actual sellers and purchasers of securities may bring a private
damages action under federal securities law.53
Because of the purchaser-seller rule articulated in Blue Chip
Stamps, plaintiffs have tried to circumvent SLUSA—and thus avoid
federal court—by framing their complaints to avoid allegations that
they purchased or sold securities as a result of the defendant’s
fraudulent conduct.54 For example, in Pacific Life Insurance Co. v.
Spurgeon, the plaintiffs defined the class as those investors who held
the defendant’s securities during the class period but who did not
purchase or sell shares during that period.55 Under the purchaserseller rule of Blue Chip Stamps, the plaintiffs would not be able to

50

Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 725.
Id. at 725-26.
52
Id. at 26.
53
Id. at 730-31 (citing Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d.
Cir. 1952)).
54
See Kircher, 403 F.3d at 482.
55
Id. at 483.
51
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maintain this as a Rule 10b-5 action.56 The defendants removed the
case to federal court, but the district court remanded the case to state
court.57
As a result of these proceedings, the Kircher plaintiffs argued that
once a private action is untenable under Blue Chip Stamps for failing
to meet the standing requirements, that action is accordingly
unaffected by SLUSA.58 The Kircher plaintiffs’ argument makes
sense. Because the Spurgeon class defined itself as those who neither
sold nor purchased shares, it failed to meet the standing requirement
announced in Blue Chip Stamps.59 Likewise, because the class
members neither sold nor purchased shares, it failed the “in connection
with the purchase or sale” requirement of SLUSA.60 Therefore,
SLUSA should not apply to cases in which plaintiffs, such as the
Kircher class, merely held their securities.61
Instead of following this reasoning, the Seventh Circuit explored
the actual meaning of SLUSA’s “in connection with” language.62 It
compared the parallel language in §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and held that
because all three statutes use the same language, SLUSA has the same
scope as §10(b) and Rule 10b-5.63 That said, the court looked to the
meaning of “in connection with the purchase or sale” under the federal
securities laws to determine its meaning under SLUSA.64 It concluded
that the invocation of §10(b) “does not depend on proof that the
agency or United States purchased or sold securities; instead the ‘in
56

Id.
Id. (citing Pac. Life Ins. Co. v. Spurgeon, 319 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1126 n. 5
(C.D. Cal. 2004). In Spurgeon, the district court held that jurisdiction was lacking
over Pacific Life’s declaratory action claiming non-liability under federal securities
laws because such a federal claim only arose as a defense to a state-created action of
breach of fiduciary duty.
58
Id.
59
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1975).
60
Kircher, 403 F.3d at 483.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
57
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connection with’ language ensures that the fraud occurs in securities
transactions rather than some other activity.”65
This reasoning allowed the Seventh Circuit to dismiss the import
of Blue Chip Stamps. It rejected the argument that Blue Chip Stamps
limited federal securities actions to situations in which the plaintiff
traded securities.66 Rather, the Blue Chip Stamps purchaser-seller rule
did not restrict coverage of SLUSA.67 It therefore held that
“limitations on private rights of action to enforce § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 do not open the door to litigation about securities transactions
under state law.”68
In addition to disregarding the application of the purchaser-seller
rule of Blue Chip Stamps to SLUSA, the court also disregarded the
Supreme Court’s holding as to the proper recourse for a plaintiff who
has merely held securities during the class period. Under Blue Chip
Stamps, a case in which the plaintiff fails to buy or sell securities
during the class period is not one that falls within the ambit of the
PSLRA, and therefore it is not one that should be brought in federal
court under federal question jurisdiction.69 Rather, such plaintiffs
should instead seek a remedy in state courts.70 Without looking at the
legislative history or congressional intent behind SLUSA, the Kircher
court decided that instead of being relegated to state court, such
plaintiffs would have to litigate the action as a derivative action or
commit the claim to the SEC.71 This result undermines the purpose of

65

Id.
Id. “Blue Chip Stamps came out as it did not because § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
are limited to situations in which the plaintiff itself traded securities, but because a
private right of action to enforce these provisions is a judicial creation and the Court
wanted to confine these actions to situations where litigation is apt to do more good
than harm” (emphasis added).
67
Id.
68
Id. at 484.
69
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754 (1975).
70
Id. at 738 n.9
71
Kircher, 403 F.3d at 484.
66
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SLUSA, which was to target “only those claims that were meant to be
brought in federal court subject to the PSLRA’s restrictions.”72
In Kircher, the Seventh Circuit alluded that it was agreeing with
its sister circuits who were confronted with similar claims by stating
that it, too, found that the scope of SLUSA’s coverage tracked that of
§10(b) and Rule 10b-5.73 However, the court failed to note that its
sister circuits did find that the purchaser-seller rule of Blue Chip
Stamps limited SLUSA and that in cases where the plaintiffs failed the
Blue Chip Stamps standing requirement, the case should be brought in
state court.74 By bypassing the significance of Blue Chip Stamps, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that the purchaser-seller rule did not affect
SLUSA and that even in situations where the plaintiff did not buy or
sell securities, the case still could not be brought in state court. 75
Rather, the case must be brought as a derivative action or committed to
public prosecutors.76
IV. COMPARING KIRCHER WITH ITS SISTER CIRCUITS
The first circuit to compare the scope of SLUSA with §10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 was the Eighth
Circuit in Green v. Ameritrade, Inc. in February, 2002.77 In Green, the
plaintiff filed its original complaint in state court alleging that
subscribers to the defendant’s Real-Time program made investment
decisions to purchase or sell options based on information that the
defendant provided.78 The defendant removed the action to federal
72

Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25, 42 (2d
Cir. 2005).
73
Kircher, 403 F.3d at 483-84.
74
See e.g., Dabit, 395 F.3d at 40; Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., 279 F.3d 590,
598-99 (8th Cir. 2002).
75
Kircher, 403 F.3d at 483.
76
Id. at 484.
77
279 F.3d at 597-98.
78
Id. at 593-94. The Real Time service provided subscribers with real time
stock price information with one click of a button.
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court and moved to dismiss the action as preempted by SLUSA.79
Instead of dismissing the action, the court gave the plaintiff 35 days to
amend his complaint.80 In his amended complaint, the plaintiff
avoided any reference to a purchase or sale and alleged that the
defendant breached its contract when it failed to provide a certain kind
of price information.81 The district court held that SLUSA did not
preempt the plaintiff’s claim, and the defendant appealed.82 On
appeal, the Second Circuit decided whether the complaint gave rise to
a federal question under the federal securities laws as opposed to a
state law breach of contract claim.83 In order to show preemption
under SLUSA, the claim must satisfy four requirements: “(1) the
action is a ‘covered class action’ under SLUSA, (2) the action purports
to be based on state law, (3) the defendant is alleged to have
misrepresented or omitted a material fact (or to have used or employed
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance), and (4) the
defendant is alleged to have engaged in conduct described by criterion
‘in connection with’ the purchase or sale of a ‘covered security.’”84
The Eighth Circuit relied on the rule announced in Blue Chip
Stamps that a cause of action under Rule 10b-5 required that the
plaintiff either purchased or sold the securities at issue.85 The court
was not persuaded by the defendant’s argument that the language “in
connection with” should be interpreted with flexibility, stating that
Congress had “specifically rejected suggestions to broaden the scope
of the statute to include mere attempts to purchase or sell a security.”86
In reconciling Blue Chip Stamps with SLUSA, the court held that non-

79

Id. at 594.
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 596.
84
Id. The district court only found that defendant failed to meet the third
requirement. Id. at n.5.
85
Id. at 597.
86
Id.
80
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sellers and non-purchasers were not preempted by SLUSA.87 Despite
having knowledge that the plaintiff’s original complaint alleged fraud
in connection with the sale or purchase of securities, the court did not
conclude that sales or purchases were implied in the plaintiff’s
amended complaint, which avoided any reference to purchases or sales
of securities.88 It seems as though the court knew that the plaintiff was
attempting to evade SLUSA and that the district court, in granting an
extension to file an amended complaint, actually encouraged an artful
crafting of the complaint in order to remain in state court.
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit in Kircher found that the
sale and purchase of securities were implied in the plaintiffs’
allegations, despite having any evidence of the sort that the Green
court did.89 Another contrast between Kircher and Green is how they
interpreted the effect of SLUSA preemption. Whereas the Kircher
court held that the claims of plaintiffs who did not trade would be left
to public enforcement, the Green court held such claims should be
remanded to state court.90
Shortly after Green was decided, in June 2002, the Eleventh
Circuit addressed the scope of SLUSA in Riley v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc.91 In Riley, the trustees of the
Performance Toyota, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan (“Performance Plan”)
and the trustee of the Master Packaging, Inc. 401(k) plan (“Master
Packaging”) filed a class action in federal court against the defendant
alleging securities fraud in connection with the purchase and retention
of shares under Florida law.92 The Performance Plan plaintiffs then
moved to dismiss itself from the federal court action and re-filed its
case in state court.93 Pursuant to SLUSA, the defendant removed
87

Id. at 598.
Id. at 593-93, 598.
89
Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust and Putnam Inv. Mgmt., L.L.C., 403 F.3d
478, 402 (7th Cir. 2005).
90
Id. at 484; Green, 279 F.3d at 599.
91
292 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2002).
92
Id. at 1336.
93
Id.
88
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these plaintiffs back to federal court, and the plaintiffs subsequently
moved to remand the action to state court.94 The district court denied
the plaintiffs’ motion and dismissed both the Performance Plan and
Master Packaging complaints under SLUSA and for lack of diversity
jurisdiction.95 The plaintiffs appealed.96
With respect to the Performance Plan plaintiffs, the Eleventh
Circuit had to determine whether SLUSA applied to their claims.97
The court first assessed the scope of the “in connection with” language
of SLUSA as it compares to the parallel language of § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.98 The court analogized SLUSA to the latter federal securities
laws because SLUSA was enacted as an amendment to the 1933 and
1934 Acts.99 In essence, when enacting SLUSA, “Congress was not
writing on a blank slate; instead, it was legislating in an area that had
engendered tremendous amounts of litigation and received substantial
judicial attention.”100 In addition to relying on Blue Chip Stamps for
the rule that SLUSA does not govern claims based solely on the
retention of securities, the Eleventh Circuit cited a more recent case,
Gutierrez v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P.101 The court in Gutierrez held
that SLUSA did not cover the plaintiffs’ claim that the defendant’s acts
caused them to hold securities that they otherwise would have sold.102
With respect to the Performance Plan plaintiffs, however, SLUSA did
apply because the plaintiffs had alleged not only that the defendant’s
misrepresentations caused them to retain their shares, but to purchase
them, as well.103 The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Gutierrez court
94

Id.
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 1340.
98
Id. at 1342.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 1343. (citing Gutierrez v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 147 F. Supp. 2d
584, 592 (W.D. Tex. 2001)).
102
Id. at 1344 (citing Gutierrez, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 592).
103
Id. at 1345 (citing Gutierrez, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 592).
95
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that plaintiffs with retention claims were entitled to bring their claims
in state court.104
By contrast, the Seventh Circuit did not permit the Kircher
plaintiffs to pursue their retention claim in state court. 105 Rather,
according to the Seventh Circuit, the anti-fraud securities laws do not
require proof of purchase or sale, and therefore the court may imply
such in a plaintiff’s retention claim.106 Even if the court chose to
believe that the Kircher class contained only non-purchasers and nonsellers, state court would not be a viable alternative.107
A few months later, in October 2002, the Ninth Circuit addressed
the same issue as to whether state law fraud claims were preempted by
SLUSA in Falkowski v. Imation Corp.108 In Falkowski, the plaintiffs
filed suit in state court alleging breach of contract and fraud in
connection with their employee stock options.109 Specifically, the
defendant company and its executives had granted stock options to the
plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants induced them
to remain with the company by misrepresenting the value of the stock
and options.110 The defendants removed the case to federal court, and
the district court held that removal was proper because the plaintiffs’
claims were preempted by SLUSA.111 The plaintiffs appealed.112
After concluding that the company’s stock qualified as a “covered
security” under SLUSA, the Ninth Circuit analyzed whether the
alleged misrepresentations were “in connection with the purchase or
sale” of the defendants’ stock.113 Citing to Blue Chip Stamps, the court
104

Id. at 1345.
Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust and Putnam Inv. Mgmt., LLC, et al., 403
F.3d 478, 483-84 (7th Cir. 2005).
106
Id. at 483.
107
Id. at 483-84.
108
309 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002).
109
Id. at 1127.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 1129.
105
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held that the mere grant of an employee stock option was in and of
itself a “sale” of that covered security, and therefore the plaintiffs’
claims satisfied SLUSA.114
The Seventh Circuit in Kircher could have followed the reasoning
of the Falkowski court to show that even non-traders of stock, by
virtue of the fact that they held stock, constitute “purchasers” and
“sellers” of securities for purposes of Rule 10b-5.115 The Falkowski
court cited Blue Chip Stamps for the argument that under the 1933 and
1934 Acts,
[T]he holders of puts, calls, options, and other
contractual rights or duties to purchase or sell securities
have been recognized as “purchasers” or “sellers” of
securities for purposes of Rule 10b-5, not because of a
judicial conclusion that they were similarly situated to
“purchasers” or “sellers,” but because the definitional
provisions of the 1934 Act themselves grant such
status.116
Therefore, it is sufficient that a person merely contracts to sell a
security, even if the sale is never actually consummated, for the
conduct to fall within the ambit of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.117 The
court squarely held that when a company grants an employee stock
option, that is a “sale” of that covered security, regardless of whether
or not the employee chooses to exercise the option.118
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit in Kircher could have made the
more compelling argument that SLUSA nevertheless pre-empted the
plaintiffs’ claims despite the fact that the class members never actually
114

Id. at 1129-30.
Id. at 1129.
116
Id.
117
Id. The Falkowski court refers to this as the “aborted purchaser-seller
doctrine.” Id.
118
Id. at 1129-30. The court did, however, place some limitation on the scope
of this language, such that there must be “more than some tangential relation”
between the fraud and stock sale. Id. at 1131.
115
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traded. Instead, the court assumed that some investors must have
purchased their interest during the class period and some members
who owned stock at the beginning of the period must have sold some
or all of their stock during the period.119 Therefore, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that many class members had engaged in the
purchase and/or sale of their stock.120
The last Circuit to address this issue was the Second Circuit in the
case Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.121 In Dabit,
the plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit suit in district court on
diversity grounds alleging that the defendant issued biased research
and investment recommendations in order to obtain investment
banking business, a violation of state law.122 The district court
dismissed the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as
the case was preempted by SLUSA.123 Like the plaintiffs in Kircher,
the plaintiff in Dabit argued that SLUSA did not preempt his actions
because the allegations did not involve misrepresentations or
omissions of material fact “in connection with the purchase or sale of .
. . covered securit[ies].”124 Rather, the Dabit plaintiff sought damages
incurred when the defendant fraudulently induced him to hold certain
securities and for lost commissions as a result of recommending
securities based on the defendant’s false research reports.125
Following the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Riley,126 the Second
Circuit held that meaning of “in connection with” under SLUSA had
119

Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust and Putnam Inv. Mgmt., L.L.C., 403 F.3d
478, 482 (7th Cir. 2005).
120
Id.
121
395 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 2005).
122
Id. at 28-30. The plaintiffs filed this class action in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, and the Judicial Panel for
Multidistrict Litigation subsequently transferred the case to the Southern District of
New York.
123
Id. at 28.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334, 1342
(11th Cir. 2002).
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the same scope as the similar language of § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5.127 In addition, there was
nothing in the statute’s text or legislative history to overcome the
presumption that when Congress adopted SLUSA, which incorporated
the language of § 10b and Rule 10b-5, it simultaneously adopted the
judicial interpretation of that language in § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.128
The Dabit court dismissed the defendant and SEC’s argument that the
purchaser-seller rule announced in Blue Chip Stamps was irrelevant to
whether a claim was preempted by SLUSA.129 For, although Blue
Chip Stamps provides a federal remedy only to purchasers and sellers
of stock, non-purchasers and non-sellers could still seek a remedy
under state law.130 Therefore, the Second Circuit conceded that the
purchaser-seller rule limits SLUSA’s “in connection with”
requirement, and thus it does not preempt claims in which the
plaintiffs deny having purchased or sold securities during the relevant
class period.131 However, the court held that Dabit’s claim
nevertheless satisfied SLUSA because it implicitly alleged purchases
made by plaintiff and putative class members.132 Significantly, the
court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the claims
without prejudice, in order to allow the plaintiff to plead a claim under
state law.133
127

Dabit, 395 F.3d at 28.
Id. at 36.
129
Id. at 39.
130
Id. at 40 (citing Blue Chip Stamps et al. v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 738 n.9 (1917).
131
Id. “There is no clear support in the legislative history for the conclusion
that Congress intended SLUSA to preempt claims that do not satisfy the Blue Chip
rule.” Id. at 41. “[W]e hold that in enacting SLUSA Congress sought only to ensure
that class actions brought by plaintiffs who satisfy the Blue Chip purchaser-seller
rule are subject to federal securities laws.” Id. at 43.
132
Id. at 40, 46 (finding that the entire claim should be dismissed because the
class included members who relied on misleading or fraudulent “buy
recommendations,” therefore satisfying the “in connection with” requirement for
SLUSA preemption.).
133
Id. at 47.
128
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By contrast, the Seventh Circuit in Kircher reasoned that the
standing requirement in Blue Chip Stamps did not mean that the claims
of non-purchasers and non-sellers fell outside of § 10(b) and Rule 10b5 and into state court but rather that such claims were to be left to
public enforcement.134 While both the Kircher and Dabit courts
ultimately concluded that purchases and sales were implicit in the
plaintiffs’ allegations, had they not reached this conclusion, the Dabit
court would have found that SLUSA did not preempt the plaintiff’s
claims, and therefore the case must be decided under state law.135
Alternatively, the Kircher court would have required the plaintiffs to
litigate their claim as either a derivative action in federal court or to
commit the case to public prosecutors.136
The Second Circuit in Dabit squarely held that the Blue Chip
Stamps’ purchaser-seller rule applied to the construction of the “in
connection with” language under SLUSA whereas the Seventh Circuit
in Kircher held that Blue Chip Stamps did not restrict coverage of
SLUSA.137 Dabit declares that while the purpose of SLUSA may be
to prevent plaintiffs from seeking to evade federal law by filing in
state court, this would only preempt claims “that could have been
brought in federal court to begin with.”138 Under Blue Chip Stamps, a
plaintiff’s claim of fraud that is not in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security is not one which could be brought in federal court.139
Therefore, although the language “in connection with” tracks the
similar language in § 10b and Rule 10b-5, a federal court must first
determine whether the putative class includes purchasers or sellers
before deciding whether the claim is preempted by SLUSA.140

134

Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust and Putnam Inv. Mgmt., L.L.C., 403 F.3d
478, 484 (7th Cir. 2005).
135
Id. at 482; Dabit, 395 F.3d at 40.
136
Kircher, 403 F.3d at 484.
137
Id. at 483; Dabit, 359 F.3d at 50-51.
138
Dabit, 395 F.3d at 41-42 (emphasis added).
139
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1917).
140
Dabit, 395 F.3d at 42-43.
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V. CONCLUSION
In 1975, the Supreme Court decided Blue Chip Stamps, holding
that a plaintiff must have purchased or sold securities in order to have
standing for a Rule 10b-5 claim.141 In the alternative, a plaintiff who
claimed that he merely held securities sand thus lacked standing must
file a state-law securities fraud claim in state court.142 Thirty years
later in Kircher, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the purchaser-seller
rule announced in Blue Chip Stamps did not affect the impact of
SLUSA, which limits certain class actions under state law where the
plaintiff alleges securities fraud “in connection with the purchase or
sale of a covered security.”143 Rather, the Seventh Circuit, fearful that
plaintiffs were trying to evade SLUSA and thus federal court
jurisdiction, read beyond the complaint to imply that the plaintiffs
must have purchased or sold securities during the class period.144
Furthermore, the court held that even had the class consisted of nonpurchasers and non-sellers, the proper recourse would be to commit
the case to public prosecutors or file a derivative action as opposed to
litigating the claim in state court.145
The Seventh Circuit alluded that it was following the reasoning of
its sister circuits by deciding that SLUSA’s coverage was as broad as
the scope of private damages under Rule 10b-5.146 However, the court
departed from decisions by the Eighth, Eleventh, and Second Circuits
in concluding that even non-purchasers and non-sellers were
preempted by SLUSA and that the proper recourse was not to file in

141

Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730-31.
Id. at 738 n.9.
143
15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2000); Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust and Putnam Inv.
Mgmt. L.L.C., 403 F.3d 478, 483 (7th Cir. 2005).
144
Kircher, 403 F.3d at 482.
145
Id. at 484.
146
Id. at 483-84.
142
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state court but rather to leave the case to public prosecutors or file a
derivative action. 147
Perhaps the Seventh Circuit was so harsh on the Kircher plaintiffs
by refusing to lend credence to the Blue Chip Stamps purchaser-seller
rule because it was frustrated by what it thought was the plaintiffs’
attempt to evade federal court. The court stated:
[P]laintiffs’ claims depend on statements made or
omitted in connection with their own purchases of the
funds’ securities . . . Indeed, most of the approximately
200 suits filed against mutual funds in the last two
years alleging that the home-exchange-valuation rule
can be exploited by arbitrageurs have been filed in
federal court under Rule 10b-5. Our plaintiffs’ effort to
define non-purchaser-non-seller classes is designed to
evade PSLRA in order to litigate a securities class
action in state court in the hope that a local judge or
jury may produce an idiosyncratic award. It is the very
sort of maneuver that SLUSA is designed to prevent.148
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Kircher impacts the use
of the federal court’s jurisdictional powers. By allowing
SLUSA to preempt securities actions in which the plaintiff
merely held as opposed to purchased or sold securities, the
Seventh Circuit has expanded federal jurisdiction and limited
state court jurisdiction. Perhaps this decision was the Seventh
Circuit’s way of curbing abuses of federal securities fraud
litigation by preventing plaintiffs from evading federal court
and avoiding the heightened standards imposed by the PSLRA.
While having suspicions about potentially meritless securities
class actions is justified, the Kircher opinion may have gone
too far. For, the Seventh Circuit’s decision effectively limits
147

Id. at 484 (stating that, “[b]y depicting their classes as containing entirely
non-traders, plaintiffs do not take their claims outside § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5”).
148
Id.
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plaintiffs’ remedies. If their case is preempted by SLUSA,
despite the fact that they did not purchase or sell securities,
they are required to hand over their case to the SEC or pursue
their claim as a derivative action. As a result, plaintiffs are
unable to obtain monetary relief for themselves, individually.
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